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DETERMINING RELEVANCY: ARTICLE IV OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence deals with
relevancy, the fundamental concept underlying the admissi-
bility of any evidence. Notwithstanding any other rules or
considerations, an item of evidence is inadmissible unless it
meets the test of relevancy.' The principle that relevant evi-
dence is generally admissible, while non-relevant evidence is
excluded, is "a presupposition involved in the very conception
of a rational system of evidence. ' '2 Article IV consists of two
major parts. Rules 401 through 403 provide uniform, working
definitions of the concepts of relevancy and probative value
and articulate the basic principle of relevance underlying
admission and exclusion of evidence in the federal scheme.3
Rules 404 through 411 concern specific provisions affecting
the admissibility of common types of circumstantial evi-
dence.4 The purpose of this comment is to examine the policy
considerations underlying the Federal Rules of Evidence re-
garding the determination of relevant evidence, to evaluate
the effectiveness of their expression, and to briefly compare
the posture of the Federal Rules with the rules presently
applied in Louisiana.5
Relevancy and Its Exclusionary Counterweights
Definition of Relevant Evidence
The concept of relevancy eludes exact definition,6 thus
any attempt to define it with precision will be necessarily
1. Weinstein & Berger, Basic Rules of Relevancy in the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence, 4 GA. L. REV. 43, 45 (1969).
2. J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 264 (1898) [hereinaf-
ter cited as THAYER].
3. Schmertz, Relevancy and Its Policy Counterweights: A Brief Excur-
sion through Article IV of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED.
B.J. 1 (1974).
4. Id.
5. For a discussion of Louisiana law concerning relevancy, see Comment,
Louisiana Evidence: Relevant and Material Aspects, 21 LOY. L. REV. 476
(1975).
6. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE
FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 401[01] at 401-08
(1975) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN & BERGER].
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unsatisfactory. Recognizing that mechanistic resort to legal
formulae cannot resolve questions of relevancy, Rule 4017 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence makes no attempt to furnish a
mechanical formula for the determination of relevancy. How-
ever, a working definition of relevancy is necessary since
evidence is admissible only when it is relevant. Relevant evi-
dence may be defined as that evidence which, when tested by
the processes of legal reasoning, possesses sufficient proba-
tive value to justify its receipt at trial; 8 if evidence has any
tendency to prove or disprove any proposition, it is relevant
to that proposition. 9 The existence of this relationship is de-
termined through the logical application of principles evolved
from experience or science.1 0 Thus, relevancy appears more a
matter of logic and common sense than a matter of law.'
Rule 401 provides that evidence is relevant if it has "any
tendency to make the existence" of the fact to be proved
"more probable or less probable."'1 2 The language of Rule 401
indicates that the Advisory Committee adopted Thayer's con-
cept of logical relevancy rather than the legal relevancy
theory espoused by Wigmore.' 3 According to Thayer, "the law
furnishes no test of relevancy. For this, it tacitly refers to
logic and general experience.' 4 Wigmore, on the other hand,
rejected the logical relevancy test as insufficient, preferring
instead a test of legal relevance; he urged the requirement of
a higher degree of probative value for admissibility than
7. FED. R. EVID. 401: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable that it would be
without the evidence."
8. FED. R. EVID. 401, Adv. Comm. Note. See LA. R.S. 15:441 (1950): "Rel-
evant evidence is that [evidence] tending to show the commission of the
offense and the intent . . . , or tending to negative the commission of the
offense and the intent." See also Vignes-Bombet Co. v. Rowe, 288 So. 2d 889
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1973) ("For evidence to be relevant it must have some
probative value and be reasonably connected to the transaction in ques-
tion.").
9. "Relevancy . . . is not an inherent characteristic of any item of evi-
dence but exists as a relation between an item of evidence and a proposition
sought to be proved." James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L.
REV. 689, 690 (1941).
10. Id. at 696 n.15.
11. Id. at 694.
12. FED. R. EVID. 401.
13. 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER 401[06] at 401-19-20.
14. THAYER at 265.
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would normally be required in ordinary reasoning.15 The Ad-
visory Committee felt that any standard requiring more than
an apparent altering of probabilities was unworkable and un-
realistic. 1 6 Thus it provided that all logically relevant evi-
dence is prima facie admissible regardless of the degree of its
probative value, and should be excluded only because of rec-
ognized policy considerations. 7 The reason for adopting the
logical relevancy approach is that a single standard is easier
to apply, and although logical relevance does not provide
the sole test of admissibility, it provides an appropriate start-
ing point under the Federal Rules. 8
An important aspect of Rule 401 is its specification of the
kind of fact to which proof may properly be directed. Rather
than referring to "material facts," the Rule identifies as
properly provable any fact "of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action."' 9 In rejecting the term "material" the
Advisory Committee adopted the view of the California Law
Revision Commission which stated that "the term had ac-
quired an artificial meaning in the legalistic sense that makes
15. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 29 at 409 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
1 WIGMORE].
16. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 401[06] at 401-18.
17. The importance of Thayer's approach is that the exclusion of evi-
dence on policy grounds is relegated to a completely separate step from the
actual determination of its relevancy. The court first determines whether the
evidence is logically relevant. If it is, the court, in the context of trial can
determine if the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative
value. See Comment, Relevancy and Its Limits in the Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 167, 168 (1969).
18. For a further discussion of logical relevance versus legal relevance,
see Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L.
REV. 385 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Trautman]; James, Relevancy, Probabil-
ity and the Law, 29 CAuF. L. REV. 689 (1941); Peterfreund, Relevancy and Its
Limits in the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts: Article IV, 25 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 80 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Peterfreund].
19. Louisiana requires that "evidence must be relevant to the material
issue." LA. R.S. 15:435 (1950). LA. R.S. 15:442 (1950) provides: "The relevancy
of evidence must be determined by the purpose for which it is offered; and
when evidence has been excluded when offered for one purpose, but admitted
when offered for another, its effect must be restricted to the purpose for
which admitted, but no one can be heard to establish a fact for one purpose
and deny it for another." See generally State v. Davis, 311 So. 2d 860 (La.
1975); State v. Devore, 309 So. 2d 325 (La. 1975); State v. Rogers, 241 La. 841,
132 So. 2d 819, cert. denied 370 U.S. 963 (1961); State v. Washington, 225 La.
1021, 74 So. 2d 200 (1954). See'also State v. Senegal, 316 So. 2d 124 (La. 1975);
State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940).
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it of little value in precise statutory drafting." 20 Courts, in-
cluding those in Louisiana, have often confused the concept of
materiality with that of relevancy. 21 If an item of evidence
tends to prove or disprove any proposition, it is relevant to
that proposition; 22 however, in order for that evidence to be
admissible the proposition must be properly provable, though
it need not be "in dispute. ' 23 If the proposition is not properly
provable the evidence is immaterial, or under the theory of
Rule 401, inconsequential, not irrelevant. Materiality or con-
sequentiality is determined primarily by substantive law and
pleadings. 24 Though crucial for analytical purposes, the con-
cept of materiality, or consequentiality, is contained within
the definition of relevancy in Rule 401 and need not be made
the basis of a separate objection when evidence fails to relate
a consequential fact.25
Ultimately, whether an item of evidence has sufficient
tendency to make a consequential fact more or less probable
under the test of Rule 401 rests in the discretion of the trial
judge.26 The judge's own experience and conceptions rather
than legal precedent will often furnish the basis for the de-
termination. 27
Application of the Relevancy Rule
Rules 402 and 403 are designed to aid the judge in his
determination of admissibility vel non of proffered evidence.
These rules recognize that the favored policies of judicial
efficiency and fairness to the parties dictate that certain evi-
dence must be excluded from the fact finder even though it
meets the test of relevance expressed in Rule 401.
Rule 40228 provides that "all relevant evidence is admis-
20. Tentative Recommendations and Studies Relating to the Uniform
Rules of Evidence (Art. I. General Provisions), 6 CAL. LAW REVISION
COMM'N, REP., REC. AND STUDIES 10-11 (1964).
21. See, e.g., State v. Birdsell, 232 La. 725, 95 So. 2d 290 (1957); State v.
Borde, 209 La. 905, 25 So. 2d 736 (1946).
22. Peterfreund at 81.
23. Id. For example, if a party attempts to introduce an item of evidence
tending to establish a proposition beyond the scope of the matter pleaded in
his petition, the proposition is not properly provable.
24. Peterfreund at 81.
25. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 401[03] at 401-13.
26. Id. 401[08] at 401-29.
27. Id. 401(01] at 401-7. See Peterfreund at 82.
28. FED. R. EVID. 402: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
1975]
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sible .... Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
The Rule also recognizes that even though an item of evi-
dence is logically relevant under Rule 401, it may not be
admitted if prohibited "by the Constitution of the United
States,29 by Act of Congress, 30 by these rules, 3 1 or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority. '32 Rule 402 reflects Congress's belief that the more
information the trier of fact receives, the greater will be its
ability to discover the truth; however, ascertainment of truth
is not necessarily served by indiscriminate admission of all
evidence. 3 Rule 402 makes no attempt to enumerate the un-
derlying policies which may dictate exclusion, but these
policies find expression in two traditional classes of exclusion-
ary rules that have different objectives. One class, which
Wigmore called "auxiliary rules of probative force," includes
evidence that is excluded, although relevant, in the hope of
improving the quality of proof and strengthening the proba-
bility of ascertaining the truth.3 4 The second class limits ad-
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Con-
gress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not ad-
missible." Rule 402 is a further extension of the concept of relevancy en-
visioned by Thayer: "[R]ules of evidence should be simplified, and should take
on the general character of principles, to guide the sound judgment of the
judge, rather than the minute rules to bind it. The two leading principles
should be brought into conspicuous relief: (1) That nothing is to be received
which is not logically probative of some matter required to be proved; and (2)
That everything which is thus probative should come in unless a clear
ground of policy of law excludes it." THAYER at 530.
29. E.g., relevant evidence could not be admitted if to do so would violate
an individual's constitutional right to be protected against unreasonable
searches found in the fourth amendment, or his right to due process pro-
tected by the fifth amendment.
30. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f) (records of refusal of visas or permits to enter
the United States are confidential, subject to the discretion of the Secretary
of State to make them available to a court upon certification of need); 10
U.S.C. § 3693 (replacement certificate of honorable discharge from the Army
is not admissible in evidence).
31. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 404-411.
32. Added by Congress. The original version promulgated by the Su-
preme Court read: "or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court." Fed. R.
Evid. 402 (Sup. Ct. Draft 1972). E.g., FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE, FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
33. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 402[01] at 402-5.
34. See generally 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1171-2169 (McNaughten ed.
1961). E.g., rules pertaining to hearsay, opinion evidence and the best evi-
dence rule.
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missibility in order to further some extrinsic policy which the
law considers more important than ascertaining the truth in
the particular case.35
Rule 40336 is an application of Thayer's view that al-
though an item of evidence is probative, it should be inadmis-
sible if a clear ground of policy or law dictates its exclusion. 37
Although the Rule enumerates certain risks that must be
weighed against the probative value of the proffered evi-
dence to determine its admissibility, the Rule provides no
absolute test and is instead designed as a guide for handling
situations for which no specific rules have been formulated.3 8
The trial judge must balance probative value against the
prejudicial effect of admitting the evidence.3 9 In an attempt
to aid the judge in the balancing process the Advisory Com-
mittee defined "unfair prejudice" as "an undue tendency to
suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not
necessarily, an emotional one."'40
The discretion of the trial judge41 to exclude logically
35. E.g., rules recognizing certain privileges and rules prohibiting the
use of illegally obtained evidence. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 2175-2396 (McNaughten ed. 1961).
36. FED. R. EVID. 403: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prej-
udice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
37. THAYER at 530. Rule 403, like Rule 401 and Rule 402, applies to all
forms of evidence: direct, circumstantial, testimonial, documentary, real and
demonstrative. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 403[01] at 403-4.
38. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 403[02] at 403-13.
39. The trial judge may, of course, refer to case law as precedent when
engaging in this balancing process. Ultimately, however, admissibility rests
in the trial judge's discretion.
40. FED. R. EVID. 403, Adv. Comm. Note.
41. As originally drafted, Rule 403 made exclusion mandatory if the
probative value of offered evidence was "substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."
Fed. R. Evid. 403 (Sup. Ct. Draft 1972); WEINSTEIN & BERGER 403[01] at
403-4. The intention was to mitigate opposition from those who believe
mechanical non-discretionary rules of evidence can be drafted. WEINSTEIN &
BERGER 403[02] at 403-12. Ultimately, however, the drafters were per-
suaded that the better practice was to make the entire rule discretionary.
The differences between the mandatory and discretionary subdivisions of the
Rule as originally drafted were of emphasis rather than kind because inclu-
sion of such terms as "substantially outweighed," "danger" and "unfair
prejudice" indicated the broad powers of the judge to characterize the evi-




relevant evidence because of policy considerations cannot be
ruled by whim and caprice, nor by mechanical rules; the
Rules formulate a rational standard by which his determina-
tions can be measured to avoid abuse of discretion. 42 Profes-
sor Trautman suggests that the judge first determine
whether a logical relation exists between the evidence offered
and a proposition before the court, and then decide whether
the relation is such that, when measured by "policies of judi-
cial administration," the evidence should be submitted to the
fact finder.43 Thus the trial judge may exclude an item of
evidence for one of two reasons-because the offered evidence
is not logically relevant," or to effectuate stated policy con-
siderations. 45 Generally the sounder approach, when the
likelihood of unfair prejudice, confusion, undue delay, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence is unclear, is to
admit the evidence, taking necessary precautions by way of
appropriate instructions to the jury.46 Therefore, Rule 403
should be applied to exclude evidence only infrequently and
cautiously, and when it is used, a clear statement of reasons
for exclusion should be made for the record. 47
Notably, Rule 403 does not give the court discretion to
exclude relevant evidence on the basis of surprise. The posi-
tion reflected in the Rule is contrary to that favored by
McCormick, 48 and that found in the Model Code of Evidence 49
and the Uniform Rules of Evidence,50 and follows instead the
42. Trautman at 393.
43. Id. at 387. The procedure utilized by Louisiana courts is not unlike
that suggested by Professor Trautman. See State v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781, 788
(La. 1973) (the judge must resolve two preliminary questions in determining
admissibility of evidence: "(1) Was it relevant to an issue of the case? (2) If
relevant, was it too prejudicial?"). For other cases recognizing the necessity
for'weighing probative value against prejudicial effect, see State v. Davis, 311
So. 2d 860 (La. 1975); State v. Foss, 310 So. 2d 573 (La. 1975); State v. Grant,
295 So. 2d 168 (La. 1973); State v. Pettle, 286 So. 2d 625 (La. 1973).
44. The effect of Rule 402 is to render inadmissible evidence which is not
logically relevant.
45. Rule 403 anticipates exclusion of logically relevant evidence where
policy considerations make its admission undesirable on balance. See gener-
ally Trautman at 397-98.
46. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 403[01] at 403-7.
47. Id. 403[02] at 403-14.
48. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 185 at 440 (Cleary ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMICK].
49. MODEL CODE OF EID. rule 303(1)(c) (1942).
50. UNIFORM RuLE OF EVID. 45(c) (1953).
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common law rule which rejected surprise as a ground for
exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence. 51 However, surprise
may still be a factor bearing on exclusion of evidence if the
court determines that a continuance is necessary if the evi-
dence is admitted. If the evidence is without high probative
value, the delay caused by a necessary continuance may jus-
tify exclusion of the evidence as a "waste of time" or because
it would result in "undue delay" of the trial.52
Character Evidence
In general, character evidence53 may be used for two fun-
damentally different purposes: first, character may itself be
an element of a crime, claim, or defense; second, it may be
used circumstantially to establish that a person acted in con-
formity therewith on a particular occasion.54 The first use of
character is commonly referred to as "character in issue";
5 5
the possession of a particular character trait is an operative
fact which under substantive law determines the legal rights
and liabilities of the parties. 56 Rule 40457 makes no provision
51. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1849 (3d ed. 1940). The Advisory Commit-
tee cites with approval the conclusion of the California Law Revision Com-
mission that "surprise should not be a ground for inadmissibility. Surprise
frequently is an essential tool for uncovering the truth. The trial judge may
protect a party from any unfairness by granting a continuance." Tentative
Recommendations and Studies Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence
(Art. VI. Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility), 6 CAL. LAW REVISION
COMM'N, REP., REC. AND STUDIES 612 (1964).
52. WEINSTEIN & BERGER $ 403[06] at 403-41.
53. Character and habit are not synonymous concepts, although they are
closely related. "Character is a generalized description of one's disposition, or
of one's disposition in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance
or peacefulness. 'Habit' . . . describes one's regular response to a repeated
specific situation." MCCORMICK § 195 at 462. Character must also be distin-
guished from reputation, which is but one method of proving character under
Rule 404.
54. FED. R. EVID. 404, Adv. Comm. Note.
55. MCCORMICK § 187 at 443.
56. Id. Illustrations of instances in which character is in issue are the
chastity of the victim under a state statute specifying her chastity as an
element of the crime of seduction, or in a defamation suit where the slander
charged bad character and defendant pleads truth. MCCORMICK § 187 at 443
n.8.
57. FED. R. EVID. 404: "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: (1) . . . (e]vidence of a
1975]
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for the use of character evidence where character is in issue
because no general problem of relevancy arises in connection
with evidence offered for this purpose.58 Rule 404 is exclu-
sively concerned with the second purpose for which character
evidence is used: to prove circumstantially that a person
acted in conformity with his character in a specific instance.
Circumstantial use of character evidence raises questions
of admissibility since, though arguably relevant, such evi-
dence may be of little probative value and may be objection-
able under Rule 403 as unduly prejudicial. Consequently, Rule
404(a) provides that character evidence may not ordinarily be
used to establish that a person acted in conformity with his
character on a particular occasion; the Rule then lists par-
ticular exceptions to the general exclusionary rule. Sig-
nificantly, when Rule 404 allows circumstantial use of charac-
ter evidence, only pertinent traits of character, and not gen-
eral moral character, may be proved.59
Use of Character Evidence in Criminal Cases
The rationale of the general exclusionary rule articulated
in Rule 404(a)60 is that the probative value of character evi-
pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution
to rebut the same; (2) . . . [e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the
first aggressor; (3) . . . [e]vidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
rules 607, 608, and 609 .... Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
58. While Rule 404 does not address the use of character evidence where
character is properly in issue, Rule 405, which specifies the allowable
methods for proving character, governs not only those situations in which
character is used circumstantially but also those in which character is in
issue. See FED. R. EVID. 405, Adv. Comm. Note.
59. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) & (2). Ladd, Some Highlights of the New Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 1 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 191, 215 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Ladd]. See LA. R.S. 15:480 (1950) which provides that evidence of the good
character of a defendant "must be restricted to showing character as to such
moral qualities as have pertinence to the crime with which he is charged."
LA. R.S. 15:481 (1950) restricts the proof of defendant's bad character by the
state to a rebuttal of defendant's evidence of good character. See also State v.
Kelly, 237 La. 991, 112 So. 2d 687 (1959) (proof of character is restricted to
moral qualities which have pertinence to the crime charged).
60. See text of Rule 404 in note 57, supra.
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dence is usually outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the
fact finder. Character evidence offered solely to show an ac-
cused's propensity to commit a crime is excluded because it
creates a danger that a jury will punish the accused for
offenses other than those charged or will convict him though
unsure of his guilt because it is convinced that he is a bad
man.6 ' The introduction of such evidence against a criminal
defendant could lead to convictions on insufficient evidence
because the character evidence is given greater probative
value than it deserves. 6 2
By express exception to the exclusionary principle of
Rule 404(a), an accused may introduce particularly relevant
character traits as circumstantial evidence of his innocence,
and the prosecution is then permitted to rebut this evidence
by introduction of pertinent bad character traits of the ac-
cused.6 3 Additionally, an accused may introduce pertinent
evidence of the character of the victim, as in support of a
claim of self-defense to a charge of homicide or consent in a
case of rape, and the prosecution may introduce similar evi-
dence in rebuttal.6 The Rule also permits the prosecution to
61. Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant-A Reevalua-
tion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evi-
dence of Propensity to Commit Crime, 78 HARv. L. REV. 426, 436 (1964).
62. Id.
63. Louisiana is in accord. LA. R.S. 15:480-81 (1950); State v. Kelly, 237
La. 991, 11 So. 2d 687 (1959). See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for
the 1958-1959 Term-Evidence, 20 LA. L. REV. 335 (1960). See also State v.
Jackson, 309 So. 2d 318 (La. 1975); State v. Flood, 301 So. 2d 637 (La. 1974);
State v. McGuffey, 301 So. 2d 582 (La. 1974). -
64. Unlike Rule 404(a)(2), in Louisiana, evidence of the dangerous
character of the victim is not admissible without first establishing evidence
of a hostile demonstration or overt act on the part of the victim. LA. R.S.
15:482 (Supp. 1952). Proof of the requisite hostile demonstration or overt act
must be to the satisfaction of the trial judge, subject to judicial review for
abuse of discretion. The trial judge's decision will not be overruled unless it is
manifestly erroneous. State v. Groves, 311 So. 2d 230 (La. 1975); State v.
Jackson, 308 So. 2d 265 (La. 1975); State v. Weathers, 304 So. 2d 662 (La. 1974);
State v. Foreman, 240 So. 2d 736 (La. 1970); State v. Terry, 221 La. 1109, 61
So. 2d 888 (1952). In State v. Groves (Tate, J. concurring) and State v. Weathers
(Tate, J. dissenting), Justice Tate pointed out that an amendment to LA. R.S.
15:482 in 1952 changed the language from "proof of hostile demonstration
.." to "evidence of hostile demonstration." Because of this change, he states
it is no longer the trial judge's function to determine the credibility of evi-
dence submitted to establish a hostile demonstration or overt act because
this is a jury function. Justice Tate believes the majority's reliance on pre-
1952 jurisprudence is erroneous. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Evidence, 14 LA. L. REV. 220, 226 (1953). See
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introduce evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the
victim to rebut the defendant's allegation that the victim was
the first aggressor. Finally, the Rule authorizes examination
of the character of a witness insofar as it bears on his credi-
bility.65
Rule 404(b) prohibits the use of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts to prove the character of a person in order to establish
guilt circumstantially. The Rule makes it clear, however,
that the evidence may be admitted for other purposes such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.66 Even
also State v. Harding, 307 So. 2d 338 (La. 1975) (the supreme court found
abuse of discretion by the trial judge).
65. LA. R.S. 15:495 (1950) requires that a proper foundation be laid before
a witness can be impeached. Rule 404(a)(3) has no such requirement. See
Comment, Article VI of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Witnesses, 36 LA. L.
REV. 99, 113 (1975).
66. See text of Rule 404 in note 57, supra. Cf. LA. R.S. 15:495 (1950):
"Evidence of conviction of crime, but not of arrest, indictment or prosecution,
is admissible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness, but
before evidence of such former conviction can be adduced from any other
source than the witness whose credibility is to be impeached, he must have
been questioned on cross-examination as to such conviction, and have failed
distinctly to admit the same; and no witness, whether he be defendant or not,
can be asked on cross-examination whether or not he has ever been indicted
or arrested, and can only be questioned as to conviction, and as provided
herein."
In State v. Prieur, 227 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973), the Louisiana, Supreme Court
imposed certain procedural prerequisites to the use of prior crimes evidence
to establish knowledge, intent, and system, including prior notice in writing
to the defendant, specification of the exception under which it is offered,
assurance that the evidence is necessary rather than merely cumulative, and
appropriate instructions to the jury concerning the purpose for the introduc-
tion of the evidence. See Comment, Other Crimes Evidence in Louisiana-I.
To Show Knowledge, Intent, System, Etc. in the Case in Chief, 33 LA. L REV.
614 (1973). See also Comment, Other Crimes Evidence in Louisiana-II. To
Attack the Credibility of the Defendant on Cross-Examination, 33 LA. L. REV.
630 (1973). The Louisiana Supreme Court appears committed to enforcement
of the Prieur requirements. State v. Pearson, 296 So. 2d 316 (La. 1974) (Prieur
rule cannot be circumvented by introduction of other crimes evidence on
cross-examination or rebuttal; guidelines must be followed); State v. Ghoram,
290 So. 2d 850 (La. 1974) (same effect). Some recent cases have limited Prieur.
State v. Davis, 311 So. 2d 860 (La. 1975) (Prieur notice is not necessary when
the prior crimes proved constitute part of the res gestae); State v. Banks, 307
So. 2d 594 (La. 1975) (notice pursuant to Prieur guidelines failed to specify
the exception under which it was offered). The Louisiana Supreme Court in
Banks declared that "[t]he rules of Prieur were not meant to be used as
additional, technical procedures sacramental to a valid conviction. Substan-
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though evidence of prior acts is admissible for these other
purposes, the trial judge should resort to the balancing test of
Rule 403 to insure that the danger of unfair prejudice does
not outweigh the probative value of the evidence.6 7 The obvi-
ous danger of character evidence is that a jury may exagger-
ate its value because the crime charged is similar to a prior
offense, because it appears that the defendant is generally
bad, or even because the evidence makes him look so bad that
his witnesses should not be believed. Therefore, even though
"other crimes" evidence may be logically relevant to show
motive, opportunity, intent and the like, the court should
exclude it if other means are available to prove such issues.6 8
Use of Character Evidence in Civil Cases
Rule 404 reflects the general rule prevailing in most
jurisdictions, including Louisiana, which rejects evidence of
character in civil actions when offered as a basis for inferring
an act.69 The Advisory Committee rejected the argument that
circumstantial use of character should be allowed in civil
cases to the same extent as in criminal cases under Rule
404.70 In criminal cases the defendant must raise the issue of
character and by tradition is entitled to the consequences
tial compliance with this procedure designed to insure a fair trial when 'other
offenses' are involved will not be penalized." 307 So. 2d at 597. Also in Banks
the court permitted prior crimes evidence to be used in rebuttal of defen-
dant's testimony without Prieur notice having been given--contrary to the
earlier position in Pearson and Ghoram. For cases excluding prior crimes
evidence because the prejudice outweighed the probative value, see State v.
Foss, 310 So. 2d 573 (La. 1975); State v. Hicks, 301 So. 2d 357 (La. 1974); State
v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973). See also State v. Grant, 295 So. 2d 168 (La.
1973); State v. Feazal, 278 So. 2d 64 (La. 1973). Although LA. R.S. 15:495 (1950)
lists only knowledge, intent and system as matters properly provable by
other crimes evidence, other matters have been proved by receipt of such
evidence. State v. Banks, 307 So. 2d 594 (La. 1975) (identity); State v. Moore,
277 So. 2d 141 (La. 1973) (identity); State v. Dowdy, 217 La. 773, 47 So. 2d 496
(1950) (motive).
67. FED. R. EVID. 404, Adv. Comm. Note.
68. Peterfreund at 87.
69. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 404[03] at 404-18. Louisiana is in accord.
Gould v. Bebee, 134 La. 123, 63 So. 848 (1913) (evidence of the character of a
party is ordinarily inadmissible in a civil case). See also Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Treadwell, 79 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1935) (the character of a party who is not a
witness is generally irrelevant unless the nature of the issue directly in-
volves character).
70. FED. R. EVID. 404, Adv. Comm. Note.
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that may accrue. 71 The Advisory Committee concluded that
the bases for exceptions found in Rule 404 for criminal cases
lie more in history and experience than in logic, and that
those who wished to extend these exceptions to civil cases
had not met the burden of persuasion. 72 However, Rule 404
does not prohibit the use of character evidence in civil cases
when character is in issue, when offered to attack the credi-
bility of a witness, or when offered to prove something other
than that the defendant acted in conformity with his charac-
ter on a particular occasion. 73
Methods of Proving Character
Rule 40574 specifies three permissible methods of proving
character: by testimony as to reputation, by testimony in the
form of opinion, and by evidence of specific instances of con-
duct. 75 The relevancy of character in a particular case deter-
mines the method of proof which may be used. 76 Evidence of
specific instances of conduct is the most convincing of the
three methods of proof, but it also possesses the greatest
capacity to arouse prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and to
waste time. Therefore, the Rule confines the use of specific
instances of conduct to cases where character is in issue and
hence deserving of a searching inquiry. When character is
used circumstantially to establish guilt or innocence, it may
'be proved only by reputation or opinion. These latter methods
of proof are also available when character is in issue.77
71. Ladd at 216.
72. FED. R. EVID. 404, Adv. Comm. Note.
73. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 404(03] at 404-18-19. The same rule would
apply in Louisiana to civil trials. For example, a trial for defamation would
allow use of character evidence to prove action in conformity therewith
because character is in issue. Note that although Rule 404(b) would allow the
use of other crimes, wrongs or acts to show "absence of mistake or accident,"
Louisiana law is to the contrary. Cassanova v. Paramount-Richards
Theatres, Inc., 204 La. 813, 16 So. 2d 444 (1943).
74. FED. R. EVID. 405: "In all cases in which evidence of character or a
trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony
as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-
examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential
element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific
instances of his conduct."
75. LA. R.S. 15:479 (1950) provides that only evidence of reputation may
be used to establish character.
76. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 405[01] at 405-14.
77. FED. R. EVID. 405, Adv. Comm. Note.
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In Louisiana, as in a majority of American jurisdictions,
evidence of reputation is the only method by which character
may be proved when it is being used circumstantially. 8 The
justification for restricting proof of character to reputation
testimony is that the aggregate judgment of a community is
considered generally more reliable than the personal opinion
of a witness whose testimony might reflect his own feelings
and biases.79 The assumption is that the cumulative opinion
of many people affords a degree of trustworthiness which
could not be obtained by an individual opinion of a single
witness regardless of how well acquainted he is with the par-
ty's character.8 0
Rejecting the traditional arguments, the Advisory Com-
mittee elected to allow proof of character by means of per-
sonal opinion.8 l It recognized that "the persistence of reputa-
tion evidence is due to its largely being opinion in disguise.
'82
The danger of opinion evidence can almost always be avoided
by efficient cross-examination which may expose personal
hostility on the part of the witness or reveal that the opinion
is based on a single isolated instance.8 3 Furthermore, in an
urban society a person may have no general reputation in the
community, while it is usually possible to find individuals
with sufficient association with a person to have formed an
opinion about him.8
4
Rule 405 permits proof of character by specific instances
of conduct, but only in limited situations.8 5 The main objection
78. LA. R.S. 15:479 (1950). See, e.g., State v. Boudreaux, 221 La. 1078, 61 So.
2d 878 (1952) (prior conviction inadmissible to prove the bad character of the
victim); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-
Evidence, 14 LA. L. REV. 220 (1953).
79. Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IOWA L.
REV. 498, 513 (1939).
80. Id. Furthermore it was feared that opinion evidence might be used as
a subterfuge to prove character by means of specific conduct where such
proof was prohibited. Id. at 511.
81. Louisiana law does not permit proof of character by opinion. State v.
Chapman, 251 La. 1089, 208 So. 2d 686 (1968); State v. Howard, 230 La. 327, 88
So. 2d 387 (1956); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1967-1968
Term-Evidence, 29 LA. L. REV. 310, 316 (1969); The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1955-1956 Term-Evidence, 17 LA. L. REV. 421 (1957).
See Comment, Opinion and Expert Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 36 LA.
L. REV. 123, 124 (1975).
82. FED. R. EVID. 405, Adv. Comm. Note.
83. Ladd, supra note 79 at 511.
84. Ladd at 218.
85. Specific instances of conduct may not be used to prove character
when character is being offered as circumstantial evidence of conduct. Peter-
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to use of specific acts to prove character is "based largely on
the time it would take and the confusion which would result
from going into the many collateral issues which would
arise."8 6 However, most jurisdictions permit inquiring on
cross-examination whether a witness testifying as to reputa-
tion has heard of particular instances of conduct pertinent to
the trait in question. 87 Accordingly, Rule 405(a) allows inquiry
into specific instances of conduct on cross-examination. How-
ever, Rule 405(b) also permits this method of proof on direct
examination when character is in issue. Since inquiry into
specific instances of conduct is limited to these instances,
Rule 405 clearly contemplates that testimony of specific in-
stances of conduct is not generally permissible on the direct
examination of an opinion witness to character.88
Habit and Routine Practice
Habit "describes one's regular response to a repeated
specific situation." 89 Unlike character evidence, habit or
routine practice is generally considered relevant to prove cir-
cumstantially that conduct on a particular occasion con-
formed to the habit 0 The reason for the acceptance of a rule
allowing evidence of habit is the belief that the probative
value of habitual conduct is greatY1 Unlike the rule prevail-
freund at 89. Louisiana law is in accord. Proof of character by specific in-
stances of conduct is not permitted. See, e.g., State v. Foreman, 240 So. 2d 736
(La. 1970).
86. Ladd, supra note 79 at 508.
87. FED. R. EVID. 405, Adv. Comm. Note. See, e.g., Michelson v. United
States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); State v. Banks, 307 So. 2d 594 (La. 1975) (court
allowed the prosecutor to ask the defendant's character witness about his
knowledge of the defendant's prior arrests under the theory that it was a
reasonable inquiry into the witness's knowledge of facts upon which his
opinion could be based; i.e., the court allowed the prosecutor to frame his
questions to the defendant's character witness in the "did you know?" form
rather than the "have you heard?" form); Louisiana apparently does not
require that the particular instances of conduct inquired of on cross-
examination be pertinent to the trait in question. For example, in Banks the
defendant was charged with distribution of heroin and the Louisiana Su-
preme Court allowed cross-examination concerning the character witness's
knowledge of convictions for theft and an arrest for burglary.
88. FED. R. EVID. 405, Adv. Comm. Note.
89. MCCORMICK § 195 at 462. See note 53, supra concerning the distinc-
tion between character and habit.
90. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 406[01] at 406-6.
91. "Unquestionably the uniformity of one's response to habit is far
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ing in many jurisdictions, Federal Rule 40692 requires neither
corroboration nor lack of eyewitnesses as conditions prece-
dent to admissibility of habit evidence; the Advisory Commit-
tee suggested that these factors relate to the sufficiency of
the evidence rather than its admissibility.9 3
As originally submitted to Congress, Rule 406 contained a
subdivision (b) which stated that the method of proof for
habit or routine practice could be "in the form of an opinion
or by specific instances of conduct sufficient in number to
warrant a finding that the habit existed or that the practice
was routine. '9 4 Reputation was not included because it was
thought extremely unlikely that a person would have a repu-
tation for a specific habit.9 5 Congress deleted subdivision (b)
believing that the method of proof should be left to the discre-
tion of the trial judge and decided on a case by case basis
subject to Rule 403.96 A major difficulty in accepting evidence
of habit involves the determination of the degree of proof
necessary to establish its existence.9 7 Subject to the limita-
tions of Rule 403, the determination must ultimately be made
by the trial judge in his discretion.
Subsequent Remedial Measures
Rule 40798 reflects both the prevailing common law posi-
tion and the Louisiana view excluding evidence of subsequent
greater than the consistency with which'one's conduct conforms to character
or disposition. Even though character comes in only exceptionally as evi-
dence of an act, surely any sensible man in investigating whether X did a
particular act would be greatly helped in his inquiry by evidence as to
whether he was in the habit of doing it." MCCORMICK § 195 at 463.
92. FED. R. EVID. 406: "Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine
practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of
the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the
person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the
habit or routine practice."
93. FED. R. EVID. 406, Adv. Comm. Note.
94. FED. R. EviD. 406 (Sup. Ct. Draft 1972); H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1973).
95. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 406[04] at 406-18.
96. Id. See also 1 WIGMORE § 92 at 520. The House Judiciary Committee
observed, however, that this deletion should not be construed as sanctioning
a general authorization of opinion evidence in this area. FED. R. EVID. 406
Adv. Comm. Note. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973).
97. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 406[01] at 406-07.
98. FED. R: EVID. 407: "When, after an event, measures are taken which,
if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence
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remedial measures as proof of an admission of fault,9 9 and is
designed to bring within its scope any post-accident change,
repair, or precaution. 0 0 The rationale of Rule 407 is based
upon two grounds. First, the subsequent conduct is not an
admission, because improvement of the condition which
caused the injury merely indicates a recognition that it was
in fact capable of causing injury, not that the risk of injury
was reasonably foreseeable. Subsequent remedial conduct is
not necessarily inconsistent with the conclusion that a par-
ticular injury was the result of mere accident or contributory
negligence.10 ' To admit subsequent remedial conduct as evi-
dence of culpability would be to conclude that "because the
world gets wiser as it gets older, . . . it was foolish before.' 0 2
Under a liberal theory of relevancy, this reason alone would
not support exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures since its admission would have some tendency to
sustain an inference of culpability. 0 3 The other, and more
persuasive ground for exclusion, is the policy of encouraging,
or at least not discouraging, safety precautions. 0 4
Rule 407 precludes the use of evidence of subsequent
remedial measures only when it is offered "to prove negli-
of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable
conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the exclu-
sion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose,
such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures,
if controverted, or impeachment."
99. Borst, Article IV-Relevancy, 23 FEDERATION OF INS. COUNSEL QTR.
27, 34 (1973). See Givens v. De Soto Bldg. Co., 156 La. 377, 100 So. 534 (1924);
Galloway v. Employers Mutual, 286 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973) (evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures is not admissible even to show that
the defendants had sufficient authority to order remedial action); Gauche v.
Ford Motor Co., 226 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969) (evidence of sub-
sequent remedial measures is not admissible to prove negligence but may be
considered as corroboration of other evidence of the existence of a defect);
Currier v. Saenger Theaters Corp., 10 So. 2d 526 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942).
100. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 407[01]' at 407-5.
101. FED. R. EVID. 407, Adv. Comm. Note; 2 WIGMORE § 283 at 151.
102. Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry, 21 L.T.R. (n.s.) 261, 263 (1869).
103. FED. R. EVID. 407, Adv. Comm. Note.
104. FED. R. EVID. 407, Adv. Comm. Note. However, this justification is
subject to criticism since it assumes that persons will not take remedial
actions out of fear that they might be used against them at a subsequent
trial. Many defendants will be unaware that remedial actions may be used
against them, and if this fact is known, they may make repairs to avoid the
possibility of another accident and another suit. WEINSTEIN & BERGER
407[02] at 407-9-10.
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gence or culpable conduct in connection with the event." Evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures may be admissible to
prove consequential, material facts in issue other than negli-
gence or culpable conduct,1°5 such as proof of ownership or
control, 0 6 and proof of the feasibility of taking precautionary
measures,'0 7 when these issues are controverted. Additional-
ly, evidence of subsequent remedial conduct is admissible for
impeachment purposes. The justification for admission in
these situations is that the relevancy of remedial conduct is
sufficiently probative to overcome the countervailing effect of
the policy considerations.'0 8 Care should be taken that the
permissible uses specified in Rule 407 are not applied mechan-
ically to subvert the policy goals the Rule was designed to
promote. For example, the court must use care in admitting
evidence to show the feasibility of taking precautionary mea-
sures, because the feasibility of precautionary conduct bears
on the issue of whether it was negligent not to have taken
the precaution. 10 9 Also care should be taken that use of evi-
dence of subsequent remedial conduct for impeachment pur-
poses does not undercut the policy objective of the general
exclusionary rule by allowing the cross-examiner to interject
an inference of lack of due care or of negligence. 1 0
Since Rule 407 requires that evidence relating to owner-
ship, control, or feasibility be controverted before evidence of
subsequent remedial action is admissible, a defendant may
decline to contest these issues and thereby prevent admission
of evidence of his subsequent remedial activities."' Also, the
defendant is protected by the requirement of Rule 403 that
the likelihood of prejudice, confusion, and delay be considered
105. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 407[03] at 407-13.
106. E.g., Powers v. J.B. Michael & Co., 329 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1964)
(subsequent remedial measures used to establish control).
107. E.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961)
(where plaintiff alleged defective design, changes in design were admissible
to prove that they could have been made). Since the policy for excluding
evidence of subsequent remedial conduct is to encourage persons to take
safety precautions, remedial measures taken by persons not a party to the
suit are not excluded at all by Rule 407. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 407[02] at
407-7.
108. Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 RUTGERS L.
REv. 574, 591 (1956).
109. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 407[03] at 407-14.
110. See Daggett v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 48 Cal. Rptr. 655,
313 P.2d 557 (1957).
111. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 407[01] at 407-6-8.
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by the trial judge in determining the admissibility of the
proffered evidence. 112
Compromise and Offers to Compromise
Rule 408113 provides that an offer to compromise a claim
is not admissible as an admission of the claim's validity. Two
grounds for the exclusion of evidence of an offer of com-
promise may be advanced: first, it may be irrelevant, and
second, its exclusion may be necessary to promote the volun-
tary settlement of claims which is favored by the law.1 4 The
evidence may be irrelevant because the offer may be moti-
vated by a desire to buy peace rather than an acknowledg-
ment of the merits of the claim. 1 1 5 Wigmore endorsed the
latter rationale as the "true reason for excluding an offer of
compromise. 11 6 However, the validity of Wigmore's theory of
exclusion will vary as the amount of the offer varies in rela-
tion to the claim. 117 Furthermore, automatic exclusion of evi-
dence of offers to settle on the ground that they are irrele-
vant may be criticized because the mere presence of the mo-
tive to buy peace often co-exists with other factors which
indicate a belief in the validity of the claim asserted." 8 Also,
112. Id. 407[03] at 407-13.
113. FED. R. EVID. 408: "Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promis-
ing to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which
was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove
liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or
statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This
rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable
merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This
rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another
purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a conten-
tion of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation
or prosecution."
114. MCCORMICK § 274 at 663.
115. 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1061 at 36 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited
as 4 WIGMORE].
116. Id.
117. FED. R. EvID. 408, Adv. Comm. Note. See also MCCORMICK § 274 at
663.
118. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 408[02] at 408-16. "Any of the following
states of mind may underlie an offer of settlement: (1) a belief that there is
no possibility of a successful prosecution of the claim, (2) a belief that the
claim is valid up to a certain amount.., coupled with an unwillingness to pay
more than the amount offered, (3) a belief that a valid claim exists with only
the amount of the claim in doubt, or (4) a belief that a valid claim may
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under the liberal theory embodied in Rule 401, evidence of an
offer to compromise may meet the requirements of relevancy
without regard to the determination of motive.119 The more
persuasive basis for the exclusion of evidence of offers to
compromise is promotion of the public policy favoring the out
of court compromise and settlement of disputes. 120
Rule 408 excludes not only offers of compromise but also
completed compromises when offered against a com-
promiser. 121 Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence courts generally held that, in suits between the
parties to a settlement, the completed agreement was admis-
sible.' 22 Rule 408, however, makes any evidence of a com-
promise agreement or its performance inadmissible to prove
either the validity or the amount of the original claim. 1 The
most common situation involving the use of a completed com-
promise occurs when the compromise concerns a claim arising
out of the same transaction between a third person and a
party to the suit being litigated.
124
Rule 408 also excludes evidence of conduct or statements
made in compromise negotiation,' 25 departing from the tradi-
tional common law rule in which admissions of fact made
during negotiations were not protected unless stated
hypothetically or unless expressly stated to be "without prej-
udice."' 26 The traditional rule, although apparently precise
possibly exist accompanied by uncertainty whether or not it would be suc-
cessfully maintained." Bell, Admissions Arising Out of Compromise-Are
They Irrelevant?, 31 TEx. L. REV. 239, 243-44 (1953).
119. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 408[021 at 408-17.
120. FED. R. EVID. 408, Adv. Comm. Note. McCormick suggests treating
the exclusionary rule for compromise offers as a rule of privilege. MCCoR-
MICK § 274 at 663.
121. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 408[04] at 408-22. Accord, Broussard v. State
Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 188 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
249 La. 713, 190 So. 2d 233 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 909 (1967); The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term-Evidence, 28 LA. L.
REV. 429, 434 (1968).
122. See, e.g., Huntley v. Snider, 86 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1936), rehearing
denied, 88 F.2d 335 (1937); Harbot v. Pennsylvania R.R., 44 F. Supp. 319
(W.D.N.Y. 1942); Brannam v. Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n, 151 Tex. 210, 248 S.W.2d
118 (1952).
123. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 408[04] at 408-23.
124. Id. at 408-24.
125. FED. R. EVID. 408, Adv. Comm. Note.
126. MCCORMICK § 274 at 664. Rule 408 as submitted to Congress by the
Supreme Court reversed the traditional rule. The House Committee amended
the rule to make evidence of facts disclosed during compromise negotiations
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and simple, is extremely difficult to apply, resulting in lack of
uniformity and arbitrariness largely because the court must
determine the motivation of the party in order to rule on
admissibility.127 According to the Advisory Committee, the old
rule also created a controversy over whether a given state-
ment fell within the protected offer of compromise. 128 The
expansion of coverage under Rule 408 was needed to cure the
inevitable effect of the old rule, which was to inhibit freedom
of communication with respect to compromise even among
lawyers. 129
To activate the exclusionary effect of Rule 408, the par-
ties must have an actual dispute, or at least an apparent
difference of opinion as to the validity or amount of the
claim.1.30 Thus, an offer to pay an admitted claim is admissi-
ble. Since the Rule demands exclusion of offers to compromise
only when the purpose is proving the validity or invalidity of
a claim or its amount, an offer to compromise for any other
purpose is admissible. 13 1 Evidence of compromise may be used
to prove a consequential, or material, fact in issue other than
validity or invalidity of the claim or its amount,132 such as to
negative a contention of undue delay, 33 to prove an effort to
obstruct criminal investigation or prosecution,' 34 or to show
bias or prejudice of a witness. 35 However, indiscriminate and
mechanistic application of exceptions to Rule 408 should be
avoided so that the objective of the Rule is not undermined.
The almost unavoidable impact of the disclosure of com-
promise evidence is that the jury will consider the offer or
admissible, reinstating the traditional rule. The Senate Committee restored
the original language of the Supreme Court version on the ground that it
would better promote the free communication between the parties which the
rule was designed to promote. However, the Senate Committee added a third
sentence to Rule 408 to insure that evidence which is otherwise discoverable
is not rendered inadmissible merely because it is presented in the course of
compromise negotiation. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974). The
Rule as eventually passed contained the Senate Committee's version.
127. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 408[03] at 408-20.
128. FED. R. EVID. 408, Adv. Comm. Note.
129. Id.
130. MCCORMICK § 274 at 663.
131. FED. R. EVID. 408, Adv. Comm. Note.
132. WEINSTEIN & BERGER $ 408[05] at 408-26-27.
133. 4 WIGMORE § 1061.
134. See MCCORMICK § 274 at 665.
135. See Annot., 161 A.L.R. 395 (1946).
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agreement as evidence of a concession of liability.136 There-
fore, the trial judge must carefully weigh the need for the
evidence against the potentiality of discouraging future set-
tlement negotiations. 137
Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses
Rule 409138 makes evidence of furnishing, offering, or
promising to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses oc-
casioned by an injury inadmissible to prove liability for that
injury. The rationale for the Rule is that the payment or offer
is often made from humane impulses rather than as an admis-
sion of liability. 39 Although the rationale is subject to doubt,
the Rule is desirable for the purpose of encouraging assis-
tance to the injured party by removing the risk that such
action will be used in a subsequent trial as an admission of
liability. 40 In contrast to Rule 408, Rule 409 does not extend
to conduct or statements not a part of the act of furnishing,
offering, or promising to pay.' 4 ' The difference in treatment
arises from the fundamental difference in nature of the two
rules. Communication is essential if compromises are to be
effected but this is not so in the case of payments, offers, or
promises to pay medical expenses, where factual statements
may be expected to be incidental in nature. 142 Therefore, an
express admission of liability is admissible even though
coupled with an offer of assistance if the admission can be
disclosed without mentioning the offer. 43 Non-severable ad-
missions thus remain inadmissible. 44 Finally, Rule 409 is lim-
ited to evidence offered to prove liability for the injury. An
offer of assistance is admissible for other purposes, such as to
prove control or identity of the injury-causing apparatus, or
the status of the alleged tortfeasor. 45
136. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 408[05] at 408-27.
137. Id.
138. FED. R. EvID. 409: "Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising
to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an injury is not
admissible to prove liability for the injury."
139. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 409[01] at 409-3.
140. Id. at 409-4.
141. FED. R. EvID. 409, Adv. Comm. Note.
142. Id.
143. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 409[03] at 409-6.
144. Id. E.g., "Don't worry about it; since it's my fault, I'll pay your
bills," should generally be excluded.
145. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 409[02] at 409-5.
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Offer to Plead Guilty, Nolo Contendere and Withdrawn Guilty
Plea
Federal Rules 410 provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, evi-
dence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo
contendere, or an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere
to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements
made in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or
offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal action,
case or proceeding against the person who made the plea
or offer. 146
Withdrawn pleas of guilty were held inadmissible in federal
prosecutions in Kercheval v. United States, 47 in which the
court pointed out that for a trial court to admit a withdrawn
guilty plea was inconsistent with its previous decision to
allow the accused to withdraw it, because "[bly permitting it
to be given weight the court reinstated it pro tanto.
' 14 8
Another basis for Rule 410 is that it encourages negotiation
in criminal cases between defense counsel and the prosecu-
tion with respect to pleas by providing needed flexibility
without prejudicing the rights of the accused at a subsequent
trial.149
Pleas of nolo contendere are also protected under Rule
410, although the laws of numerous states are to the con-
trary. 5 0 By excluding such pleas the Rule gives effect to the
146. FED. R. EVID. 410. The remainder of Rule provides: "This rule shall
not apply to the introduction of voluntary and reliable statements made in
court on the record in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers
where offered for impeachment purposes or in a subsequent prosecution of
the declarant for perjury or false statement. This rule shall not take effect
until August 1, 1975, and shall be superseded by any amendment to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which is inconsistent with this rule, and
which takes effect after the date of the enactment of the Act establishing
these Federal Rules of Evidence." LA. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 559 states:
"When a plea of guilty has been withdrawn or set aside, the plea and the
facts surrounding its entry shall not be admissible in evidence against the
defendant at a trial of a case." For a discussion of the admissibility of a guilty
plea not withdrawn, see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1966-1967 Term-Evidence, 28 LA. L. REV. 429, 436 (1968).
147. 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
148. Id. at 224.
149. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 410[02] at 410-16.
150. FED. R. EVID. 410, Adv. Comm. Note. See Annot., 18 A.L.R. 2d 1287
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traditional purpose of the nolo plea, which is to avoid the
admission of guilt inherent in pleas of guilty.1 1
The exclusion of offers to plead guilty or nolo contendere
as evidence of guilt promotes disposition of criminal cases by
compromise. 152 However, a distinction must be made between
an offer to the prosecution in return for leniency and an
attempt to bribe an arresting officer or prosecuting wit-
ness. 53 Such illicit offers are evidence of a consciousness of
guilt, and are admissible as implied admissions. 54
Rule 410 excludes only evidence of inculpatory pleas of-
fered against the accused,' 55 since the possibility of use for or
against other persons will not normally impair the freedom of
discussion which the Rule is designed to foster. 56 Thus, Rule
410 creates in effect a privilege in favor of the criminal defen-
dant, and his failure to object may constitute a waiver of his
right to prevent use of that evidence against him.15 7
The Conference Committee added language to Rule 410
which may in effect render it nugatory. The Committee pro-
vided that Rule 419 "shall be superseded by any amendment
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which is inconsis-
1314 (1950). See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Connolly, 206 La. 883, 20 So. 2d
168 (1944) (plea of nolo contendere has no effect beyond the particular case
and cannot be employed against defendant as an admission in any civil suit
for the same act). See also LA. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 552(4) (Supp. 1972)
(sentence imposed after nolo contendere plea for certain traffic offenses is a
conviction and provides a basis for prosecution or sentencing under multiple
offender laws or for the granting, suspension or revocation of licenses to
operate motor vehicles).
151. FED. R. EVID. 410, Adv. Comm. Note.
152. Id. "Effective criminal law administration in many localities would
hardly be possible if a large proportion of the charges were not disposed of by
such compromises." MCCORMICK § 274 at 665.
153. See MCCORMICK § 274 at 665.
154. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 410[03] at 410-22.
155. Rule 410 makes offers to plead and withdrawn pleas inadmissible
"against the person who made the plea or offer." Despite this language, pleas
of guilty or of nolo contendere by a codefendant, or alleged co-offender cannot
be used as evidence against other individuals charged with the same offense.
WEINSTEIN & BERGER 410[06] at 410-30. Such evidence would amount to an
extrajudicial admission which is excluded under the hearsay rule. FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(3) (statements offered against the accused are excluded from the
statement against interest exception).
156. FED. R. EVID. 410, Adv. Comm. Note.
157. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 410[05] at 410-23. See Moreland v. United
States, 270 F.2d 887, 890 (10th Cir. 1959); Hodge v. United States, 13 F.2d 596,
598-99 (6th Cir. 1926).
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tent with this rule, and which takes effect after the date of
the enactment' of the Act establishing these Federal Rules of
Evidence.' 158 The Committee anticipated the recent amend-
ment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6), 159 which
admits statements made in connection with, and relevant to,
the pleas or offers only in "criminal proceeding[s] for perjury
or false statement if the statement was made by the defen-
dant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of coun-
sel.' 6 0 Rule 410 would admit such statements if "voluntary
and reliable . . . and made in court, on the record . . . and
offered for impeachment purposes or in a subsequent pros-
ecution of the declarant for perjury or false statement."''
Therefore, since to the extent that Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(e)(6) is inconsistent with Rule 410 the latter has
no application, 62 statements made in connection with with-
158. FED. R. EVID. 410.
159. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in
this paragraph, evidence of a plea of'guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo
contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime
charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection with, and
relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil
or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer. How-
ever, evidence of a statement made in connection with, and relevant to, a
plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo contendere, or an offer to plead
guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, is admissi-
ble in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement
was made by the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of
counsel." See H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1974). Rule 410 was
not to become effective until August 1, 1975, the effective date of FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(e)(6), and only then if consistent with the latter rule.
160. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6).
161. The Senate Judiciary Committee amended Rule 410 as submitted by
the Supreme Court to state that its exclusionary effect did not apply to
voluntary and reliable statements made in connection with the pleas or
offers where offered for "impeachment purposes or in a subsequent prosecu-
tion of the declarant for perjury or false statement." This was contrary to the
rule as adopted by the House Judiciary Committee which would have ren-
dered inadmissible for any purposes statements made in connection with
pleas and offers as well. The purpose of the Senate amendment was to reduce
the scope of the rule in order to prevent injustice, particularly where "a
defendant would be able to contradict his previous statements and thereby
lie with impunity." S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1974).
162. See 120 CONG. REC. H. 12253 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) wherein Rep-
resentative William Hungate states that if any rule of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure becomes effective after Rule 410 was enacted and is
inconsistent with that rule, Rule 410 is rendered "ineffective and inoper-
able."
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drawn pleas of guilty, pleas of nolo contendere, or offers to
plead guilty or nolo contendere may not be used for im-
peachment purposes, they are excluded from all civil cases,
and when they are sought to be used in criminal cases charg-
ing perjury, they are inadmissible unless made under oath
and in the presence of counsel.
Liability Insurance
Rule 411163 excludes evidence of liability insurance as
proof of the insured's fault,164 recognizing that inferences
drawn from the presence or lack of insurance are tenuous at
best.16 5 Even absent the express language of Rule 411, the
low probative value and the possibility of prejudice resulting
from the admission of such evidence would probably result in
exclusion under Rule 403.166 The underlying rationale for the
exclusion of evidence of insurance is the fear that knowledge
of the presence or absence of liability insurance will induce
juries to decide cases on improper grounds. 67 The Rule pro-
tects not only the defendant, but also the plaintiff from im-
proper inferences concerning contributory negligence or
163. FED. R. EVID. 411: "Evidence that a person was or was not insured
against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted negli-
gently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of
evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose,
such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a
witness."
164. This reflects the uniform practice of virtually all federal and state
courts. Annot., 4 A.L.R. 2d 761, 767 (1949).
165. FED. R. EVID. 411, Adv. Comm. Note. Since the rule is based on the
premise that evidence of insurance coverage may be used prejudicially by the
jury, and in view of the inevitable assumption by jurors today that a defen-
dant is probably insured, a defendant should be permitted to show he is not
insured. The courts, however, have held otherwise and have excluded such
evidence except in cases where the plaintiff has injected the suggestion that
the defendant is insured. MCCORMICK § 201 at 482.
166. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 411[02] at 411-05.
167. FED. R. EVID. 411, Adv. Comm. Note. See McCORMICK § 201. It has
been argued that evidence of insurance should be excluded because the
fact-finder may believe that the existence of insurance will make the insured
less careful. This rationale is diminished by the fact that in many situations
regard for personal safety is of utmost importance regardless of insurance
coverage. Also a reverse inference is just as likely to result, since an insured
person may be regarded as more prudent and careful than one without
insurance. MCCORMICK § 201 at 479.
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other fault on his part.168 Aside from the exclusion of irrele-
vant evidence, Rule 411 promotes the general public policy
favoring insurance;16 9 both the insurer and the insured are
encouraged to enter into contracts of insurance with the as-
surance they will not have the agreement used against them
at a later time to establish liability.170
While evidence of liability insurance is not admissible to
prove negligence or other wrongful conduct, such evidence is
not excluded by Rule 411 when offered for other purposes.
Evidence of insurance may be admissible in vicarious liability
cases when the issue of agency is contested, since if the princi-
pal has liability insurance covering the person alleged to be
his agent or employee, the fact of coverage is strong evidence
of the existence of the agency relationship.1 71 The fact of
insurance may also be used to prove ownership or control of
the vehicle or instrumentality involved. 172
Recognizing that cross-examination for bias or prejudice
should generally be freely allowed, Rule 411 does not exclude
evidence of liability insurance when it is used to evaluate the
credibility of a witness. 173 Yet if the court has good reason to
believe that the existence of insurance has little bearing on
credibility, and that it will likely be used prejudicially, it
should exercise its power under Rule 403 to exclude it. 17 4 If
evidence of insurance is admitted for purposes of impeach-
ment, courts should, if requested, specifically charge the jury
that such evidence can only be used on the issue of credibility
168. FED. R. EVID. 411, Adv. Comm. Note.
169. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 411[02] at 411-07.
170. Id.
171. E.g., Cook-O'Brien Constr. Co. v. Crawford, 26 F.2d 574 (9th Cir.
1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 630 (1928); WEINSTEIN & BERGER 411[03] at
411-08.
172. MCCORMICK § 201 at 480. Absence of liability insurance should nor-
mally not be admissible since the possible prejudice outweighs any probative
force. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 411[03] at 411-09. But there may be instances
where failure to insure is so inconsistent with the claim of control that it
should be admitted. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 411[03] at 411-09.
173. For example, a witness may be employed by a defendant's insurer.
MCCORMICK § 201 at 480 n.10; WEINSTEIN & BERGER 411[04] at 411-10.
174. E.g., Brown v. Walter, 62 F.2d 798, 799 (2d Cir. 1933); Meek v. Miller,
38 F. Supp. 10, 12 (M.D.Pa. 1941); Coble v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 30 F. Supp.
39, 40 (N.D. Tex. 1939); WEINSTEIN & BERGER 411[04] at 411-10.
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and not in determining defendant's liability or in fixing or
measuring damages. 17 5
Yet another exception to the exclusionary effect of Rule
411 is recognized when the admission of a party, bearing on
negligence or damages, includes a reference to the fact of
insurance that cannot be severed without substantially less-
ening the evidentiary value of the admission. 176 Such admis-
sions are highly probative and under the test of Rule 403, the
probative value outweighs prejudicial effect.1 7 However, if
the witness's admission is clear without revealing the exis-
tence of insurance, or if the reference to insurance can be
easily deleted from documentary evidence, disclosure should
be avoided. 78
A witness may make a non-responsive or inadvertent ref-
erence to insurance in response to a proper question by exam-
ining counsel. 7 9 Such references will be stricken on request
but should not be a basis for a mistrial or reversal absent any
indication of bad faith on the part of the witness or of the
examining counsel. 80 Where direct action statutes are in ef-
fect, as in Louisiana,' 8 1 the jury cannot be kept unaware of
insurance. Rule 411 is, therefore, not applicable to direct ac-
tions, but the court may attempt to minimize the possibilities
of prejudice by appropriate instructions. 82
Summary
Familiarity with the structure and scope of Rules 401
through 411 is essential to an understanding of the Federal
175. E.g., Majestic v. Louisville & N.R.R., 147 F.2d 621, 627 (6th Cir. 1945);
WEINSTEIN & BERGER 411[04] at 411-10.
176. MCCORMICK § 201 at 480.
177. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 411[05] at 411-11.
178. Id.
179. MCCORMICK § 201 at 480.
180. Id. at .481; WEINSTEIN & BERGER 411[10] at 411-17.
181. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1962). Rule 411 is therefore inapplicable in
Louisiana cases when an insurer is sued directly.
182. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Harrington, 274 F.2d 323, 325-27 (5th
Cir. 1960). An amendment to Rule 411 to add, "Except in jurisdictions or
cases where an insurance carrier may be made a party, or sued directly upon
a cause of action ... " was suggested but not adopted because the result is the
same without it. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 411[06] at 411-13 n.9.
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Rules of Evidence since relevance is a prerequisite for admis-
sibility of all evidence in every trial. The Rules embody a
theoretical cohesiveness expressed in concise and flexible
form. Throughout the Rules dealing with relevancy a common
ingredient is present: discretion on the part of the trial judge.
The redactors recognized that the numerous special factors
involved in each case demand a great deal of flexibility and
that the trial judge can best assess the variables which de-
termine relevancy.
William G. Conly
